Make it Work!: Breyer on Patents in the Life Sciences by Cohen, I. Glenn
Make it Work!: Breyer on
Patents in the Life Sciences
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation I. Glenn Cohen, Make it Work!: Breyer on Patents in the Life
Sciences, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 418 (2014).
Published Version http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
vol128_breyer_tribute.pdf
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16460370
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2416979 
55
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I. Glenn Cohen
Professor of Law
Faculty Co-Director, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, 
Biotechnology, and Bioethics
Like Tim Gunn, the avuncular advisor to aspiring designers on reality 
TV’s Project Runway, if Justice Breyer had a slogan, it would be “Make it 
work!” The idea of the law as useful—as a way to solve problems—runs 
through his many writings, whether opinions, articles, or books. As he 
put it in his confirmation testimony before the Senate:
I believe that the law must work for people. The vast array of Con-
stitution, statutes, rules, regulations, practices and procedures, that 
huge vast web, has a single basic purpose. That purpose is to help the 
many different individuals who make up America—from so many 
different backgrounds and circumstances, with so many different 
needs and hopes.
This focus on making things work—making sure the train runs on 
time—is exemplified often in Justice Breyer’s questions at oral argument. 
For example, in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hiles, a case about the occupa-
tional injuries of railroad workers who connect one rail car to another, 
Justice Breyer let the railroad’s advocate know that “my law clerk found” 
a device in “the Car and Locomotive Cyclopedia for 974” that could 
make the task safer, noting that “they have four pictures.”4
 Sometimes Justice Breyer’s tendency to try to make the law work, to 
be practical rather than adversarial, produces some surreal moments. One 
of my favorite such colloquies occurred during the severability portion of 
the oral argument in NFIB v. Sebelius.5 In this part of the oral argument, 
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the Justices confronted what to do about the huge number of programs 
contained in the more than one thousand pages of the Affordable Care 
Act should they strike down the individual mandate portion. In a colloquy 
with Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler, who argued for the gov-
ernment in favor of severability, and similar to one he had earlier with Paul 
Clement, who argued for the challengers to the law, Justice Breyer asked:
justice breyer: I don’t think it’s not
4 uncommon that Congress passes an act, and then there are
5 many titles, and some of the titles have nothing to do
45
 with the other titles. That’s a common thing. And
 you’re saying you’ve never found an instance where they
 are all struck out when they have nothing to do with
4 each other.
5 My question is, because I hear Mr. Clement
 saying something not too different from what you say.
7 He talks about things at the periphery. We can’t reject
8 or accept an argument on severability because it’s a lot
9 of work for us. That’s beside the point. But do you
0 think that it’s possible for you and Mr. Clement, on
 exploring this, to—to get together and agree on—
 (Laughter)
 justice breyer:—I mean on—on a list
4 of things that are in both your opinions peripheral,
5 then you would focus on those areas where one of you
 thinks it’s peripheral and one of you thinks it’s not
7 peripheral. And at that point it might turn out to be
8 far fewer than we are currently imagining. At which
9 point we could hold an argument or figure out some way
0 or somebody hold an argument and try to—try to get
 those done.
 Is—is that a pipe dream or is that a—
 mr. kneedler: I—I—I just don’t think
4 that is realistic. The Court would be doing it without
5 the parties, the millions of parties.
In a world where every litigant was as committed to “make it work” as 
Justice Breyer, this approach would represent the ideal way forward on 
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the complex severability question the Court ultimately was able to duck. 
And while Breyer recognized it might have been a “pipe dream,” what a 
lovely dream it was. It was the kind of dream that animates his world-
view, and this worldview is quite evident in Justice Breyer’s patent opin-
ions—the subject of this tribute.
 The second defining characteristic of Justice Breyer’s approach to the 
world that is evident in his opinions is his commitment to getting things 
right based on evidence and expertise. As Linda Greenhouse poetically 
put it, Justice Breyer’s “fundamental challenge—I am tempted to call 
it his tragedy, but I hesitate to ascribe dark emotions to this optimis-
tic man—to navigate as an Enlightenment Justice in an unenlightened 
period of Supreme Court history, a counter-factual age when ideology 
routinely trumps evidence-based decision-making.”
 This element is also evident in Justice Breyer’s work in patent law. 
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. 
(“LabCorp”),7 Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Souter and Stevens) took 
the unusual step of dissenting from the Court’s dismissal of certiorari. 
In so doing, he set out the legal theory that would ultimately become 
the Court’s in its subsequent forays into patentable subject matter in the 
biosciences, culminating in this year’s decision on gene patenting.
 The case involved the amino acid known as homocysteine. Doctors 
have known for at least half a century that high homocysteine levels were 
associated with serious health problems, but it was the patent holders who 
determined the pathway: high levels of total homocysteine were signs of 
folic acid and vitamin B deficiencies. While it was well-established that 
these deficiencies led to health problems—pregnant women are routinely 
warned of spina bifida in their babies if they have too little folic acid—ac-
tually measuring folic acid and B in a patient was difficult. Measuring 
total homocysteine levels, by contrast, was quite easy, and so the associa-
tion between high homocysteine levels and these deficiencies produced a 
useful tool for clinical practice.8
 The patent holder, Metabolite, licensed its invention to LabCorp, per-
mitting it to use the tests described in the patent in return for a 7.5% 
58
share of related revenues, with the agreement permitting LabCorp to ter-
minate the arrangement if “a more cost effective commercial alternative 
is available that does not infringe a valid and enforceable claim of” the pat-
ent.9 Eventually LabCorp decided to switch to using, in some instances, 
one of Metabolite’s competitors that had developed a test, and refused to 
pay royalties on its use of these other tests.0 Metabolite sued for patent 
infringement and breach of licensing agreement. As Justice Breyer put it, 
their theory was not that using the competitor test
infringed the patent’s claims describing methods for testing for homo-
cysteine. Instead, respondents relied on a broader claim not limited to 
those tests, namely, claim , the sole claim at issue here. That claim—
set forth below in its entirety—seeks patent protection for:
“A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-
blooded animals comprising the steps of:
“assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and
“correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid 
with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.”
Claim , respondents argued, created a protected monopoly over the 
process of “correlating” test results and potential vitamin deficiencies. 
The parties agreed that the words “assaying a body fluid” refer to the 
use of any test at all, whether patented or not patented, that determines 
whether a body fluid has an “elevated level of total homocysteine.” And 
at trial, the inventors testified that claim ’s “correlating” step consists 
simply of a physician’s recognizing that a test that shows an elevated 
homocysteine level—by that very fact—shows the patient likely has a 
cobalamin or folate deficiency. They added that, because the natural 
relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency was now 
well known, such “correlating” would occur automatically in the mind 
of any competent physician.
On this understanding of the claim, respondents argued, LabCorp was 
liable for inducing doctors to infringe.
At trial, a jury found that LabCorp had infringed. The case made its way 
up to the Federal Circuit, which upheld the decision on infringement. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question “[w]hether a 
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method patent . . . directing a party simply to ‘correlat[e]’ test results can 
validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship . . . such that 
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the 
relationship after looking at a test result.” The Court granted certiorari 
against the recommendation of the Solicitor General, who recommended 
denying certiorari because “the issues necessary to address the question 
had not been fully argued below.” The Solicitor General somewhat tartly 
added that “if this Court were to consider reevaluating almost a quar-
ter-century of administrative practice and lower court jurisprudence, it 
should do so based on a full record.”
 Ultimately the Court decided to dismiss the case as improvidently 
granted—perhaps it was the pouring in of amici briefs, or perhaps it was 
the replacement of Justice O’Connor by Justice Alito on the Court, lead-
ing to a disappearing fourth vote for certiorari. But Justice Breyer wrote 
his dissent from this decision, and in so doing laid the groundwork for a 
line of jurisprudence on patentable subject matter.4
 The opinion’s explanation of why the Court was wrong to dismiss the 
petition as improvidently granted was vintage Breyer—practical, not in-
terested in adversarialism or wasting of time, taking note of when exper-
tise can be useful, and extremely respectful of his colleagues on the other 
side. Notice how impersonal he makes it:
I can find no good practical reason for refusing to decide the case. 
The relevant issue has been fully briefed and argued by the parties, the 
Government, and 0 amici. The record is comprehensive, allowing us 
to learn the precise nature of the patent claim, to consider the commer-
cial and medical context (which the parties and amici have described in 
detail), and to become familiar with the arguments made in all courts. 
Neither the factual record nor the briefing suffers from any significant 
gap. No party has identified any prejudice due to our answering the 
question. And there is no indication that LabCorp’s failure to cite § 
0 [pertaining to patentable subject matter, the main issue he would 
address] reflected unfair gamesmanship.
Of course, further consideration by the Federal Circuit might help us 
reach a better decision. Lower court consideration almost always helps. 
0
But the thoroughness of the briefing leads me to conclude that the 
extra time, cost, and uncertainty that further proceedings would en-
gender are not worth the potential benefit.
Finally, I believe that important considerations of the public inter-
est—including that of clarifying the law in this area sooner rather than 
later—argue strongly for our deciding the question presented now.5
That is,
[t]o fail to do so threatens to leave the medical profession subject to the 
restrictions imposed by this individual patent and others of its kind. 
Those restrictions may inhibit doctors from using their best medical 
judgment; they may force doctors to spend unnecessary time and en-
ergy to enter into license agreements; they may divert resources from 
the medical task of health care to the legal task of searching patent files 
for similar simple correlations; they may raise the cost of health care 
while inhibiting its effective delivery.
 Further, at the opinion’s end, we get an amazingly modest statement 
about the progression of the Court’s jurisprudence and its interaction 
with Congress that could come from only Justice Breyer, with his deep 
respect and experience serving the other branches:
Even [if the analysis on the merits we have offered is] wrong, however, 
it still would be valuable to decide this case. Our doing so would help 
diminish legal uncertainty in the area, affecting a “substantial number 
of patent claims.” See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae -4 
(filed Aug. , 005). It would permit those in the medical profes-
sion better to understand the nature of their legal obligations. It would 
help Congress determine whether legislation is needed. Cf. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 87(c) (limiting liability of medical practitioners for performance of 
certain medical and surgical procedures).
In either event, a decision from this generalist Court could contribute 
to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists and general-
ists, as to whether the patent system, as currently administered and 
enforced, adequately reflects the “careful balance” that “the federal pat-
ent laws . . . embod[y].”7
 But far from getting it wrong, Breyer’s opinion gets it exactly right. 
It was long ago established by the Court that Section 0 of the Patent 

Act “[e]xclude[s] from . . . patent protection . . . laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”8 In a very precise and short couple of 
paragraphs, he ties this rule into the animating policy motivations of pat-
ent law in a way consonant with his leitmotif of “make it work”:
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that “laws 
of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are 
not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly 
and time consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits 
of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the 
human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too 
much patent protection can impede rather than “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of patent and 
copyright protection. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage 
research by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes 
their presence can discourage research by impeding the free exchange 
of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use 
of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and 
time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring 
complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the 
patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.
Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as 
it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that underprotec-
tion can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail between 
these opposing and risky shoals is through rules that bring certain types 
of invention and discovery within the scope of patentability while ex-
cluding others. And scholars have noted that “patent law[’s] exclu[sion 
of ] fundamental scientific (including mathematical) and technological 
principles” (like copyright’s exclusion of “ideas”) is a rule of the latter 
variety. W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectu-
al Property Law 05 (00). That rule reflects “both . . . the enormous 
potential for rent seeking that would be created if property rights could 
be obtained in [those basic principles] and . . . the enormous transac-
tion costs that would be imposed on would-be users.” Id., at 05-0; 
cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.d 9,  (C.A. 90) 
(L.Hand, J.).
Thus, the Court has recognized that “[p]henomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are . . . the 

basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. , 7 (97). It has treated fundamental scientific principles as “part 
of the storehouse of knowledge” and manifestations of laws of nature as 
“free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros., supra, at 
0, 8 S. Ct. 440. And its doing so reflects a basic judgment that protec-
tion in such cases, despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would 
too often severely interfere with, or discourage, development and the fur-
ther spread of useful knowledge itself.9
 Breyer then masterfully goes from this general principle to the specific 
patent claim  in this case. While conceding that the precise boundaries 
of what is a “natural phenomenon” are fuzzy, he concludes that the patent 
in this case “is not at the boundary,” but instead that “claim  is invalid 
no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that doctrine.”0	In a 
rhetorically powerful move that will prefigure the fight over gene patents 
and testing for the BRCA  breast cancer gene, Breyer characterizes claim 
 as providing “those researchers with control over doctors’ efforts to use 
that correlation to diagnose vitamin deficiencies in a patient,” creating a 
Manichaean story of researchers and corporate patenting versus doctors 
and patients.
 Treating it as beyond cavil (and essentially conceded by the parties) 
that “the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set 
forth in claim  is a ‘natural phenomenon,’” he considers the patent 
holders’ claim “that the correlation is nonetheless patentable because 
claim  packages it in the form of a ‘process’ for detecting vitamin de-
ficiency, with discrete testing and correlating steps.”	While conceding 
that the fact that a process involves a natural phenomenon would not 
move it beyond the scope of patentable subject matter in and of itself, 
Justice Breyer can find nothing worthy of patent protection beyond the 
correlation here:
Claim ’s process instructs the user to () obtain test results and () 
think about them. Why should it matter if the test results themselves 
were obtained through an unpatented procedure that involved the 
transformation of blood? Claim  is indifferent to that fact, for it 
tells the user to use any test at all. Indeed, to use virtually any natural 

phenomenon for virtually any useful purpose could well involve the 
use of empirical information obtained through an unpatented means 
that might have involved transforming matter. . . . At most, respon-
dents have simply described the natural law at issue in the abstract 
patent language of a “process.” But they cannot avoid the fact that the 
process is no more than an instruction to read some numbers in light 
of medical knowledge. . . . One might, of course, reduce the “process” 
to a series of steps, e.g., Step : gather data; Step : read a number; Step 
: compare the number with the norm; Step 4: act accordingly. But one 
can reduce any process to a series of steps. The question is what those 
steps embody. And here, aside from the unpatented test, they embody 
only the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency that 
the researchers uncovered. In my view, that correlation is an unpatent-
able “natural phenomenon,” and I can find nothing in claim  that 
adds anything more of significance.
 For this reason, Justice Breyer concludes that claim  is not patentable 
subject matter.
 What is the significance of the LabCorp opinion? In direct terms, to be 
frank, not very much. It was a dissent from the dismissal of certiorari as 
improvidently granted, it is not binding authority, and it could merely 
have found its way into the dustbin of Supreme Court orders. Indeed, 
one might ask, why bother?
 But in fact, LabCorp proved crucial in at least three respects.
 First, Justice Breyer’s description of the patent dilemma in the area of 
diagnostics (and, in fact, health care more generally) energized discus-
sion among academics that is only now hitting its stride.4 Indeed, the 
language he used is incredibly clear and readily understandable to those 
outside science and the law. This too is one of the goals Justice Breyer 
himself espoused in his writing and public talks: for the Court to talk to 
the people in a way they can understand.
 Second, following (and relying on) his opinion, some judges in the 
Federal Circuit grew more skeptical about what constitutes patentable 
subject matter in the life sciences, while others remained somewhat re-
calcitrant, setting up a further Supreme Court correction I discuss below. 
One good example of a Federal Circuit Judge “getting the message” of 
4
Justice Breyer’s approach is Judge Moore’s dissent in Classen Immuno-
therapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,5 which explicitly invoked the language 
and ideas of Justice Breyer’s dissent to argue against patent eligibility of 
immunization schedules:
Having discovered a principle—that changing the timing of immu-
nization may change the incidence of chronic immune-mediated dis-
orders—Classen now seeks to keep it for himself. In the ‘8 patent, 
he accomplishes this goal by claiming the use of the scientific method 
to study the incidence of chronic immune-mediated disorders. This 
preempts the field of study, and prevents any investigation into any 
immunogen, known or unknown, and to any disease, known or un-
known, over any period of time. Where, as here, a patent preempts 
an idea, a basic building block of science, within a field of study, the 
patent in practical effect is a patent on the idea itself. Gottschalk, 409 
U.S. at 7, 9 S. Ct. 5.
The intent and effect of the Classen claims is clear: to keep others from 
exploring the same principle. “Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of 
overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incen-
tive to invent that underprotection can threaten.” Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 4, 7 (00) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting from dismissal of petition). Extending patent protection 
here would “severely interfere with, or discourage, development and 
the further spread of useful knowledge itself.” Id. at 8. To wit, nobody 
else can search for new immunogens, for use of new immunizations, to 
treat either existing or currently unknown chronic immune-mediated 
disorders without infringing.
 Finally, the opinion set the glidepath for the Court’s subsequent deci-
sions on patentable subject matter in the face of recalcitrance from other 
Federal Circuit judges. Justice Breyer authored the unanimous decision 
for the Court in Prometheus v. Mayo,7 which solidified and extended 
LabCorp’s approach as the law of the land. That case concerned a process 
for using the drug thiopurine to treat autoimmune diseases; specifically, 
different patients metabolize the drug differently and the patent holder 
determined that correlations between metabolite levels and a particular 
patient’s dose were “too high, risking harmful side effects, or too low, and 
so likely ineffective.”8 The patent holders’
5
claims recite () an “administering” step—instructing a doctor to ad-
minister the drug to his patient—() a “determining” step—telling 
the doctor to measure the resulting metabolite levels in the patient’s 
blood—and () a “wherein” step—describing the metabolite concen-
trations above which there is a likelihood of harmful side-effects and 
below which it is likely that the drug dosage is ineffective, and inform-
ing the doctor that metabolite concentrations above or below these 
thresholds “indicate a need” to decrease or increase (respectively) the 
drug dosage.9
 Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court continued the through line of 
LabCorp and easily found that “[t]he relation is a consequence of the 
ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—en-
tirely natural processes. And so a patent that simply describes that rela-
tion sets forth a natural law” and was thus not patentable.0 The Court 
answered no to the question “Do the patent claims add enough to their 
statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to 
qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?” Instead, the 
Court held that:
The upshot is that the three steps simply tell doctors to gather data 
from which they may draw an inference in light of the correlations. 
To put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audi-
ence about certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well-
understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the 
scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add 
nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately. For 
these reasons we believe that the steps are not sufficient to transform 
unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those 
regularities.
In so doing, Justice Breyer reined in the “machine-or-transformation” test 
for patentability that the Federal Circuit had been using, indicating that 
while that “test is an ‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have 
neither said nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclu-
sion.” He also addressed the question, which has subsequently come up 
in the gene patent and other high-profile patent decisions, on the effect 

on the life sciences industry, and the fear that a holding of no patentable 
subject matter would cripple innovation. Here Justice Breyer’s emphasis 
on “make it work” and evidence and expertise come beautifully together 
with respect to the coordinate branches as he writes:
Prometheus, supported by several amici, argues that a principle of law 
denying patent coverage here will interfere significantly with the abil-
ity of medical researchers to make valuable discoveries, particularly in 
the area of diagnostic research. That research, which includes research 
leading to the discovery of laws of nature, is expensive; it “ha[s] made 
the United States the world leader in this field”; and it requires protec-
tion. Brief for Respondent 5.
Other medical experts, however, argue strongly against a legal rule that 
would make the present claims patent eligible, invoking policy consid-
erations that point in the opposite direction. The American Medical 
Association, the American College of Medical Genetics, the American 
Hospital Association, the American Society of Human Genetics, the 
Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association for Molec-
ular Pathology, and other medical organizations tell us that if “claims to 
exclusive rights over the body’s natural responses to illness and medical 
treatment are permitted to stand, the result will be a vast thicket of 
exclusive rights over the use of critical scientific data that must remain 
widely available if physicians are to provide sound medical care.” Brief 
for American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae 7; see 
also App. to Brief for Association Internationale pour la Protection de 
la Propriete Intellectuelle et al. as Amici Curiae A, A (methods of 
medical treatment are not patentable in most of Western Europe).
We do not find this kind of difference of opinion surprising. Pat-
ent protection is, after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the 
promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to 
creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very exclu-
sivity can impede the flow of information that might permit, indeed 
spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the pat-
ented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly 
and time-consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent 
applications, and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing ar-
rangements. At the same time, patent law’s general rules must govern 
inventive activity in many different fields of human endeavor, with the 
result that the practical effects of rules that reflect a general effort to 
7
balance these considerations may differ from one field to another. See 
Bohannan & Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint, at 98-00.
In consequence, we must hesitate before departing from established 
general legal rules lest a new protective rule that seems to suit the needs 
of one field produce unforeseen results in another. And we must rec-
ognize the role of Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules where 
necessary. Cf. 5 U.S.C. §§ -4 (special rules for plant patents). We 
need not determine here whether, from a policy perspective, increased 
protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.4
 The trajectory of LabCorp and Prometheus also set the table for last 
term’s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genet-
ics, Inc.5 The case had been remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Prometheus, but when the case came before the Court again, the Court 
followed the path Justice Breyer started with LabCorp and unanimously 
held (curiously, with Justice Thomas and not Justice Breyer writing) that 
Myriad’s test for the BRCA  breast cancer gene failed the test for patent-
able subject matter (it was a “product of nature”) as to the claims relat-
ing to isolated DNA but not as to its claims relating to complementary 
DNA (cDNA).
 Justice Breyer has become the patent law judge on the Court. His dis-
sent from dismissal of certiorari in LabCorp set the stage for the most 
important Supreme Court decisions for biotech and the life sciences in 
the past half century. Throughout it all, the “Breyer-ly” virtues shine 
through: practicality, a deep interest in and understanding of how things 
work in the real world, a consideration of expertise, modesty, and respect 
for the coordinate branches.
m
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